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Abstract 
The institutional setting of open gas networks and markets is revealing considerably diverse and 
diverging roads taken by the US, the EU and Australia. We will show that this is explained by key 
choices made in the primary liberalization process. This primary liberalization is based on a definition 
of network access rights, which leads to different regimes for the transmission services, as well as for 
the gas commodity trade, as commodity trade depends on the network services to get any market deal 
actually implemented. Not only do those choices depend on the physical architecture of the network, 
but also the perceived difficulties and institutional costs of coordinating the actual transmission 
services through certain market arrangements.  
Keywords 
Network regulation, gas market, property rights, open access, gas carriage systems 
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1. Introduction1 
Natural gas market arrangements are characterized by considerably diverse institutional frames. 
Initially, one would observe that transmission infrastructures are correspondingly diverse so that it 
may be concluded that the actual architecture of infrastructures determines the best institutional frame 
for trade. We will show in this paper that this is only partly true: that necessary condition of a certain 
network architecture is not sufficient. The choice of an institutional frame for trade does not only 
depend on the physical architecture of the transmission system but also on the economic mechanisms 
chosen to frame the transmission services. This primary choice has in turn relevant economic trade-
offs so one cannot define a general best design solution. 
In developing our reasoning, we will be close to Makholm (2012) and Correljé et al. (2013), who 
studied the institutional development of market-based gas industries. The former showed how the gas 
pipeline rules evolved in the United States, and the main economic choices made by policy makers 
from the XIX century until today. The latter compares how the institutions regulating natural gas in 
the US and Europe evolved following different paths. These case studies on institutional development 
are central to understanding regulation in both the US and Europe, and they show a relevant feature: 
there is no best mechanism that can be applied to every natural gas industry. Any choice brings some 
costs and some benefits because of the existence of severe transaction costs.  
With the aim of generalizing any analysis, our paper builds an analytical framework to understand 
the economic rationale behind the different regulatory frames observed nowadays. We aim at 
clarifying the main economic trade-offs of existing models and ultimately to provide policy makers 
with institutional paths in accordance to their aims. To that end, we show what the key regulatory 
decisions are and their resulting economic incentives. We then apply this approach to four different 
regulatory frameworks: the US, Europe (UK), Australia (Victoria) and Brazil. The first three cases are 
within mature markets and their regulatory approaches show alternative paradigms in the design of gas 
markets. The fourth (Brazil) is taken as an example of a younger industry where the market design is 
still evolving.  
The economic literature has already discussed the role played by asset specificity in gas industries 
and the use of long-term contracts. For the US, see for instance Makholm (2012), (Hubbard and 
Weiner 1991), Mulherin (1986), and (Masten and Crocker 1985). For the EU, see Chevalier (2004) 
and Correljé et al. (2013). Long term contracts for gas pipelines around the world have been described 
by Victor, Jaffe & Hayes (2006). All this showed how long-term contracts and their particular clauses 
have been used to coordinate players and allocate risks among them in the context of highly specific 
industry assets.  
The precise architecture of gas networks, hence the degree of development, of such infrastructures 
determines the actual industry asset specificity and the potential for market arrangements choices. For 
instance, a transmission system made up of a single pipeline that links two single points is very highly 
specific, as all transactions there depend on the coordination among very few players (let say the 
supplier, the transporter, and the consumer). This is a typical situation at the very first step of 
development of a gas transmission system, where users are located close to a single supply point 
(being one production field, one LNG regasification facility or one large pipeline). In this case, 
vertical (or quasi-vertical) integration is typically efficient to make the system work.  
Later on, with many more consumers and diverse suppliers that can be connected to different 
transmission routes, the gas transactions become less specific. This is typical of more developed 
                                                     
1
 This paper is a rewriting of the former WP named “Gas Network and Market: à la carte?” issued in September 2013 
under the number RSCAS 2013/73. The authors apologize for any confusion that could result from the co-existence of 
two successive versions under two different names. 
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transmission systems, where the transmission infrastructure is already a meshed set of pipelines, 
compressors, storage facilities, etc. In this schematic world one understands why a young gas system 
such as the Brazilian (using a simple “Y” network) cannot act like the gigantic cobweb of the USA. 
However, this rationale does not work to explain why the actual European or Australian gas systems 
do not reproduce the US arrangements. If we want to understand the differences among existing open 
markets (like with the US, the EU and Australia), the architecture of infrastructure assets does not play 
the key role. It is the institutional structure of network opening and gas trade which plays that role and 
we will then concentrate on how gas markets have been opened up to trade and competition. 
In section 2 we show that it is the network access regime which is the key piece in a regulatory 
framework liberalizing the gas industry. Access, however, may have different definitions and content 
and also be guaranteed with different mechanisms. Section 3 shows that the way in which open access 
is granted, is the primary decision, and the first key characteristic of any gas market building. Defining 
and implementing different access regimes result in different economic relationships between the gas 
commodity trade and the gas transmission services. Section 4 shows the elementary economic trade-
offs constraining the different regimes of network open access. In turn different access regimes also 
lead to different gas markets foundations. Sections 5 and 6 illustrate this frame of analysis in the 
context of the US, the EU (case of UK), Australia (case of Victoria) and Brazil, from both a short-term 
and a long-term point of view. The last section concludes. 
2. Defining a trading system 
Gas transmission grids are characterized by a number of tight technical constraints, so the transmission 
services offered to users by a transporter can be said “site-specific” 2 and “dedicated”3. Hence, the 
contracting architecture required to trade gas at different network points and time horizons must 
necessarily be adapted, as to deal with severe transaction costs. Put it differently, players’ identity 
matters in the gas industry and one has expected a preference for long-term contracts and vertical 
integration, see (Williamson 1975) or (Williamson 1985). This fits well with the initial structure of gas 
industries heavily relying on vertically integrated or quasi-integrated utilities all around the world.  
From a theoretical standpoint, (Riordan and Williamson 1985) showed, in a general context, that 
asset specificity is ultimately a design variable, and it is frequently possible to reduce that specificity 
at the cost of simplifying the characteristics of the final products
4
. An application of this strategy can 
be found in the proposal of (Joskow and Schmalensee 1983) for building power markets. The 
reasoning is as follows: as not all segments of activity in the industry share the same transactional 
characteristics, some industry segments are easier to organize with certain market arrangements than 
others. Consequently, in the utility restructuring process, policy makers have options to decide that 
some activities will from now on be organized under market arrangements while the others might stay 
under command and control.  
The same reasoning can be applied to the gas industry as, again, some segments of the industry 
chain do not really need to be organized under command and control. Dealing with the liberalization 
of vertically integrated industries can be restated as: what are the industry segments that can be 
organized under market arrangements? Brousseau and Glachant (2014) identify three key elements in 
the creation of a trading arrangement (as a market place) which complement both the price mechanism 
                                                     
2
 Gas flows only in a given gas pipe with no alternative as long as it cannot exit it. 
3
 When a gas pipe is dimensioned for future gas flows, its size is adjusted to the contracted gas flows. Therefore, the 
economics of this gas pipe cannot stay independent from significant changes affecting the contracted flows: the pipe 
capacity is thus dedicated to these flows. 
4
 The example used by Riordan and Williamson (1985) is a bumper. It can be designed to be used in any car or to be used 
in a specific model, probably with negligible differences in production costs. The specificity of both products is the same, 
looking only at their production characteristics, but are not the same from the demand point of view. 
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and the settlement process: a) a definition of the valuable characteristics of the product to be traded; b) 
a measurement of the amount of these characteristics being traded; and c) a registration of the net 
property right changes implementing the trade among buyers and sellers. Though in the same vein, the 
creation of a trade system in the gas industry requires complementing the price mechanism and the 
settlement process with: a) a definition of the valuable characteristics of the commodity traded and of 
the related transmission services; b) a measurement of the amount of characteristics of the commodity 
and of transmission services being traded and delivered; and c) a registration of the property right 
changes implementing this trade among market players. This might be very challenging in the gas 
industry as long as an extended frame of rights has not been defined: who can do what with whom, 
when and where? In this industry, we frequently have only few big infrastructures used by numerous 
buyers and sellers feeding in or withdrawing from a common flow of gas. To open a liberalized gas 
market, access to the transmission system first has to be open. Thus, although it is easily doable to 
exclude a vast amount of individuals from using a transmission system, it is a basic choice of 
liberalization to do the opposite and to widely open access to the network 
5
. However, the precise 
meaning of ‘open access’ is quite diverse, while all access variants share the characteristic that the 
infrastructure owner has no right to discriminate amongst legitimate users.  
Open access impedes the network from colluding with certain players and excluding other players 
from accessing the transmission grid and the related market. It is why defining and implementing open 
access can be identified as the main driver of the institutional diversity found in liberalized gas 
industries. Liberalization starts with that question: what are the actual key choices made in the 
implementation of open access? The following sections are devoted to describing the main 
characteristics of gas industry restructuring alternatives.  
3. Opening a market: redefining property rights 
An interesting starting point for the reasoning of this section is the physical architecture of a gas grid: 
for a given grid architecture, what is the best alternative among the various open access schemes? Alas 
there is no unique better solution…6 To apprehend the motivation for the variety of existing access 
regimes, we have to find the rationale behind it. As defined by Ostrom and Hess (2007), property 
rights delineate the range of actions that individuals can take regarding an asset. In the process of 
opening access to gas pipelines, several dimensions of property rights are to be dealt with as they may 
give rights in different ways: injection, withdrawal, flow and pressure management, nomination, 
exclusion and alienation, etc
7
. In a completely private set of pipelines, all these rights are allocated to 
the same agent: the owner. As a non-regulated private owner, he has all the rights to access his 
property, to use it, to manage its components and operation, to exclude or include others in this or that 
usage and also the ultimate right to sell (and to transfer) any part of this set of rights to others.  
On the contrary, within an open access policy certain rights are being given to all potential users, 
and the full bundle of transmission rights ends allocated among all the players: i.e. all potentially 
legitimate users plus the regulated owner
8
. For the potentially legitimate users, open access is a right 
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 As explained by theoreticians of the commons (Ostrom and Hess 2007), open access is frequently a conscious public 
policy to avoid exclusion of any from the use of a common resource. 
6
 It is interesting to note that the electricity industry, also a network industry based on open access, has a more 
homogenous mechanism for the governance of their transmission system. Where does the difference between both 
industries come from? One key difference in the governance choices regards the externalities and the capacity to define 
property rights. As in gas industries it is easier to define property rights, the number of implementable governance 
mechanisms increases.  
7
 (Schlager and Ostrom 1992) identified these five different property rights.  
8
 Alternatively, one might consider that gas networks are made up at least of two different products: the resource system 
(the infrastructure facility) and the flow of resource units, i.e. the services that the system provides, (Ostrom and Hess 
2007). 
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vis-a-vis the transmission facility: a right to be connected to it and to become a user (notably injecting 
in and/or withdrawing from). But the next key question is then the actual definition and 
implementation of each of the various transmission rights. We might say that the right of access is an 
ex ante right to be connected to the network and a promise to be able to use its transmission services 
later on. Accordingly, the actual right of use acts like an ex post implementation of the ex-ante access 
right.  
That is why the definition of the proper rights to use transmission has to be viewed as the first 
liberalization choice to be made; the one where policy makers need to first choose between “common 
carriage” and “contract carriage”. Common and contract carriages are two alternative systems 
defining the basic frame of infrastructures’ usage. Their key elements are firstly the definition of the 
injection/withdrawal rights and secondly the exclusion rights (“the right to exclude others”) for the 
users and the operator. In the “common carriage” system (typically the EU), open 
injection/withdrawal rights are offered ex ante to all the potential users of each and every pipeline. 
While the precise ex post implementation (at the stage of network operation) of these open potential 
rights will depend of the actual way the licensed “transmission system operator” (TSO) will fulfill its 
license to operate the grid and manage the system flows. The operators of transmission facilities in the 
EU have no right a priori to exclude people from using their grids and entering the gas system. 
However, the actual implementation of users’ requests for transmission services is a lot fuzzier and is 
subject to many operational uncertainties that the TSOs will have the right to handle according to their 
operational license 
9
. It ends up firstly that injection/withdrawal rights assigned to a user do not give 
him any guarantee of excluding the other users for the same usage (individual rights are not exclusive 
vis-a-vis other potential users); secondly, that the all sets of users’ actual rights are in practice fuzzy 
(as these rights are not exclusive vis-à-vis the TSO). Conversely, that is exactly what the “contract 
carriage” avoids in the US. The set of individual rights to injection/withdrawal is pretty well defined 
ex ante in the US and restricted to only the people having duly signed a long term usage contract with 
the owner of the pipeline. This access regime actually excludes all other potential players to compete 
ex post for the very same usage of this gas network. The US practice ends up with, firstly, that 
injection/withdrawal rights assigned to an individual user do give her a credible guarantee of 
excluding all “rival users” for the same usage (the rights of usage are exclusive vis-à-vis all other 
potential users) and secondly, that the whole set of rights of all the contracted users is in practice fully 
defined and highly detailed (as being also exclusive vis-à-vis the pipeline operator). 
This reveals how much the building of market arrangements in open gas systems logically starts by 
answering two basic questions: a) How are network users’ injection/withdrawal rights defined? And b) 
How are the corresponding network transmission services designed? Having these two fundamental 
features established, we would be able to assess the different industry restructuring experiences.  
If a gas trade arrangement is implemented in a “contract carriage” regime (typically the US), the 
network users rights have already been well defined ex ante (before any usage) by the users 
negotiation of their long term usage contracts with the network owner(s). On the contrary, in a 
“common carriage” regime (typically the EU), the users rights are defined ex ante only at a central 
level as a set of regulated rules which asymmetrically produces the common regulation of system 
operation. In this process the network “system operator” defines the rules of operation of her license in 
liaison with the gas regulator (bilaterally or multilaterally; within constraints given by the legislation 
or a court). In a “common carriage” regime they are the system operator and the gas regulator who 
have the rights to decide whether to define network users property rights as weak or strong, firm or 
flexible, detailed or not, exclusive or not, rival or not, etc. For instance, regarding the available 
transmission capacity, all ex ante usage rights are affected ex post by the actual fluctuation of this 
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 The Australian system can be considered a kind of common carriage case where the rules of how to allocate capacity are 
based on a result of algorithm. Ruff (2012), among others, defines market carriage as the rule of transmission services 
allocation that depends on the differential of gas prices in different localizations. 
Gas network and market diversity in the US, the EU and Australia: A story of network access rights 
5 
capacity. It touches upon other regulated rules ranging from congestion management, balancing tools 
and activation of line-pack storage. From an incentive point of view, the process of having the network 
users’ rights being centrally defined under common carriage reduces the incentive that these users 
have to improve the operation efficiency. In contract carriage systems, oppositely, competition among 
well-defined rights’ users promotes such operation efficiency. Moreover, contract carriage’s strong 
property rights also give higher incentives to invest. It is however true that contract carriage does not 
reduce all transaction costs at the industry level. It is because it excludes all potential users having not 
signed a contract earlier (when free network capacity was available to new entry into the club of 
contracted users), and because it restricts the contracted users’ rights to the terms and conditions 
signed earlier at the beginning of the usage contract. However, both the pipe owner and the contracted 
users benefit with contract carriage form a stronger set of incentives to invest and operate within the 
range of their stronger usage contract.  
In this section we have then identified a central trade-off faced by all gas industry restructuring 
processes: (getting a stronger set of incentives to act within the tight path defined ex ante by the 
carriage contract) versus (getting lower transaction costs to act within the loose path permitted by a 
common carriage regime for new users entry and ongoing usage adaptation to unforeseen 
contingencies). Ultimately, the nature of this trade-off also determines the key features of the gas trade 
system. An over-estimation of the related transaction costs would lead to inefficient use and 
development of the transmission infrastructure. However an under-estimation would also bring 
consistent grid and system inefficiencies. Our next section will go deeper into this by studying some of 
the international experiences.  
4. The actual diversity of gas markets: the network access in practice 
In this new section we will start by looking at existing network access schemes. Accessing networks 
actually has different meanings depending on the rules of usage. We may organize the different usage 
rules under two broad headings: firstly, the mechanism allocating rights of usage among all the 
potential users, and second, the definition of the actual transmission service characteristics 
corresponding to the implementation of these usage rights (for instance where and when a nominated 
amount of gas commodity might be injected into or withdrawn from a given pipe or set of pipes).  
4.1 Capacity allocation: implicit vs explicit mechanisms 
First we will start with the implicit capacity allocation mechanism. In such a regime the market 
outcome for transmission capacity allocation and the market outcome for the commodity trade are 
voluntarily coordinated ex ante. The basic rule in an implicit design is that the transmission capacity is 
always allocated according to the merit order established in the wholesale commodity market. It is 
why one says that the transmission capacity is “implicitly” allocated within the commodity market. 
The idea of an implicit design originally comes from a pioneering power market theory, found in 
Schweppe, et al. (1988). In a power market implicit design, the dispatch of electricity generation 
depends on both the power producers’ bids and the continuous recalculation of the corresponding 
network constraints (notably losses and congestion). It is why this method of transmission allocation 
brings an enhanced operational efficiency: all the commodity market players can access quasi real 
time the transmission network exactly as the network is at every moment. Hence an implicit allocation 
deeply reduces the transaction costs uncured by the commodity market players as these players only 
need worry about their commodity market game. They do not have to coordinate the positions taken 
within the commodity market and other positions to be taken in the independent world of “blind” 
transmission capacity allocation at their own risk. In the gas industry, one also finds this purely 
rationale implicit process in the Victoria gas market design, which allocates the near to real time 
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recalculated network capacity through the commodity merit order
10
. In other words: the commodity 
market continuously receives a feed-back on the coming transmission constraints or externalities fed 
by the commodity trade decisions. With more operational efficiency and less transaction costs, the 
implicit design is not without substantial merits. 
Secondly, an alternative to the implicit design also exists, which is the “explicit” allocation. Here 
one finds an independent and separated transmission market where transmission capacity is priced and 
traded for itself disregarding what the actual commodity market equilibrium might be. It is up to each 
commodity trader to determine how to coordinate the two positions taken in the independent markets 
for commodity and for transmission. The US provides the typical explicit universe. Here the rights to 
use the pipelines capacity are defined ex ante by the usage contracts and do not take into account how 
trade will work later on in the gas commodity market. That is, gas wholesale pricing does not define 
who is entitled to use the infrastructure and no one calculates the social or the industry value of 
network constraints and externalities corresponding to the actual usage of the infrastructure. The US is 
thus just the opposite to the Victoria market model, where it was the commodity market clearing 
algorithm that decided who will ship gas within the network (through an optimization of the use of the 
entire network infrastructure among all gas commodity market players).  
To better understand what is at stake there, consider two players, A and B, who want to carry gas to 
player C by using a pipeline with capacity able to carry only one of the two players’ volumes. In the 
Victoria implicit access model, the gas commodity carried will be the cheapest offered according to 
the actual network constraints. In the US model, it will depend on who has bought the right to carry its 
gas ex ante. If this right is owned by the player with the most expensive commodity offer, both the 
expensive and the cheap commodity players may voluntarily and bilaterally negotiate for the 
commodity sourcing (before injecting it in the pipeline) or for a reallocation of the right to use the 
pipeline. If this secondary trade of capacity and commodity is made in a significant hub, this ex-post 
bargaining of rights might become multilateral. However, nobody optimizes the entire gas market 
trade according to the actual grid capabilities (and vice-versa: the grid usage and operation are not 
conceived at the industry level to saturate all the commodity trade potential gains). 
However, Europe is neither in the US nor in Australia... the EU still has different national 
regulations. But as showed by Glachant et al. (2013), there are also key EU common features, most of 
which are copied from the UK regulatory frame. 
11
 At very first glance it seems to be an explicit 
allocation of transmission capacity. In order to ship gas, players need to use the system, which is made 
up of two rights: the right to enter and the right to exit (hence: an “entry / exit system”). However, 
with a deeper view of these rights, one finds very significant differences to the US model. A key is the 
network operator’s role in case of congestion. In the UK, when defining the network users rights ex 
ante, the network operator strongly simplifies the actual physical characteristics of the gas network. 
Hence, the usage rights being allocated only align with a assumption of expected flows. As a result, 
actual flows do not necessarily correspond to the expected flows and operational reactions from the 
system operator are needed to keep control of the gas system. In this frame, one of the easiest tools for 
the system operator to manage the actual gas flows is simply to… buy or sell gas in the commodity 
market. When doing so, the system operator simply re-inserts the actual use of the network by gas 
shippers… into the commodity market… through a new round of gas trade. It is why while the 
transmission rights have been allocated “explicitly” (independently from the gas trade merit order), 
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 (Ruff 2012) describes the clearing mechanism as a model that could optimize up to 24 hours period each day. It takes into 
account the ability to transport and to store inside the line-pack in order to determine amounts of shadow prices of gas 
withdrawal at multiple locations. Even if it may have potentially strict constraints of time and localization, the gas market 
in Victoria is currently unconstrained.  
11
 Note that the UK has been considered a successful case of a gas market in Europe, and its main principles have been 
followed by national regulations and by the European Union guidelines and directives. For instance, two of the elements 
of the regulatory model now implemented in the EU are the entry/exit system and the daily balancing. 
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these rights only correspond to a simplified usage contract that the system operator keeps under its 
own central control according to the actual network flows.
12
  
In Brazil, where the rights of use were designed closer to the US carriage model, shippers must 
contract for transmission capacity ex ante in a separated contract with a separated pricing
13
. The 
absence of numerous competitive players and alternative transmission routes made this model 
appropriate because of its simplicity. However, with the potential increase of players and the potential 
development of new network capacity, a set of regulatory changes are currently being discussed. Some 
proposals are based on a mechanism of allocation derived from a simplified network modeling -hence 
a model closer to UK. 
4.2 What transmission allocates: the flexibility issue 
Transmission of gas through a network has two inherent dimensions that strongly impact trade in the 
commodity market. They are the spatial and the temporal dimensions of the gas delivery between the 
seller and the buyer. It is the feasible transmission path which counts as a secondary necessary 
condition to the location and time frame of any agreed gas trade. In practice indeed they are the 
transmission services which say where and when distinct gas trades can be considered by the market 
as the very same product hence as actual substitutes. The larger the area of injection/withdrawal and 
its time frame of operation, the higher the commodity market liquidity (by increasing the number of 
players and of deals lodged in the very “same” market equilibrium). However, the more the gas being 
uniformly traded in the commodity market differs from the real physical flows in the network, the 
more the gas system operator has to activate strong “ancillary transmission services” to reconcile the 
“notional” commodity trade and the actual network flows. (Vazquez, Hallack, and Glachant 2012). 
What one may call the “temporal” characteristics of gas transmission services corresponds to the 
time lag allowed between the gas injection and the gas withdrawal corresponding to a nominated grid 
usage. In real life, market players may be allowed -as grid users- to inject into and withdraw from the 
system at different time horizons without changing the standard market characteristics and value of 
their trade. In such a flexible market & network arrangement, the temporal specificity of the real gas 
flow in the network is institutionally decreased to ease the commodity trade.  
What one may term the “spatial” characteristics of transmission services draws the set of grid 
points where users may inject and withdraw after having bought a standard transmission service. That 
is, the set of points where the market players may trade without any risk or extra costs of delivery. It 
literally draws the limits of the commodity market. In such market/network arrangements, the spatial 
specificities of real gas flows in the network may be institutionally decreased by giving the players 
extended rights to homogeneously trade in larger zones. This decreases the transaction costs associated 
with trading the gas commodity at different locations. Correspondingly, transmission services may be 
defined as institutionally the same for a set of different feasible physical paths, so the transaction costs 
associated with tailoring transport services according to particular commodity trade opportunities are 
decreased… from the traders’ point of view.  
This is typically what the UK provides to its gas commodity trade: a gigantic ‘virtual hub’. It builds 
a virtual place of trade where any connection to the physical network is treated as staying inside the 
same commodity market. In addition, a “daily balancing” principle allows players to keep their actual 
injections and withdrawals unbalanced until the end of the gas day, i.e. it allows players to buy and 
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 For more about the simplification of the network on the entry-exit model with virtual hub, see Hallack and Vazquez 
(2013) and Vazquez, Hallack, and Glachant (2012).  
13
 It is important to notice, however, a key difference between the Brazilian and US systems in the implementation of open 
access. Contrary to the US system, in Brazil there has so far been no full separation of property rights between pipeline 
users and pipeline owners. The incentives in these cases can preclude competition, as explained by Makholm (2012) 
when analyzing the evolution of the US case. 
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sell intraday gas at any time within the day to cover their imbalances. Notice that this does not mean 
that the gas commodity price is the same throughout the day, but it does mean that the gas having been 
nominated one day ahead for transmission can be acquired in the different hours of the day with no 
other cost than its rolling market price.  
If we come back to Victoria, a gas price for all locations and for the entire coming day also exists. 
However, if unexpected congestion occurs, the system operator re-schedules the actual flows and 
makes ancillary payments (based on market bids) to the commodity players being hit. In Brazil, until 
now, there has been only a low level of transmission simplification to favor the gas commodity trade. 
This low favor for commodity trade also corresponds to the rude architecture of the network (a mere 
Y). Until now, the spatial characteristics of transmission services being offered in Brazil are strictly 
defined in the ex ante carriage contract and any change in the actual flow entry/exit calls for an 
explicit renegotiation of this contract clause with the transmission owner. However, contract 
renegotiation is facilitated in Brazil because there is just one main shipper (Petrobras), so the 
renegotiation and adaptation of carriage among the shippers is never a contentious issue. For temporal 
simplifications of gas flows, Petrobras uses the inner flexibility of its long-term supply contract unless 
the entire gas system is already at full
14
. To end with the US, both the spatial and temporal 
characteristics of transmission services are strictly defined ex ante by the carriage contract’s terms and 
conditions. This contractual frame is defined only pipeline by pipeline, and independently by each 
transmission owner. There is no “system operation” of the whole set of pipes. Hence, the spatial 
flexibility of transmission and trade can only be low to very low (except at large crossing of pipes, the 
physical hubs). The US carriage contracts are location specific as being frequently defined “point- to-
point”; while some more flexible contracts also exist usually within a given region (from a defined set 
of entry points to a defined set of exit points). Notice that in the US, such transmission services with 
higher flexibility (those taking into account a set of points) frequently have higher costs than “point-
to-point” contracts. These standard contracts also define the temporal characteristics of injection and 
withdrawal. The federal regulator FERC imposes only one restriction on the rigidity of the basic 
carriage contract: pipelines which do not allow basic time flexibility to the users must offer them a 
complementary menu where to buy some flexible transmission services 
15
 (FERC 2008).  
Table 1 - Network access: comparison of cases studies 
 Allocation of transmission 
capacity 
Spatial characteristic of 
transmission services 
Temporal characteristic of 
transmission services 
United 
States 
Explicit Fragmented - low level of 
simplification 
Limited - various 
simplification levels 
United 
Kingdom 
Explicit (but with implicit 
secondary features) 
Enlarged - high level of 
simplification 
Enlarged - high level of 
simplification 
Victoria 
(Australia) 
Implicit Enlarged - high level of 
simplification 
Enlarged - high level of 
simplification 
Brazil Explicit Enlarged - low level of 
simplification 
Enlarged - high level of 
simplification 
Source: Authors elaboration 
                                                     
14
 It became an anti-trust case in Brazil in 1998 when Petrobras was using part of the pipeline to store gas (by line-pack) 
and another company (British Gas) asked for available capacity. For details see CADE (1998). 
15
 We do not have data regarding what the rate of pipelines is offering higher and lower temporal flexibility (higher timing 
difference between injection and withdrawal). What we observe is the increased offer of services of flexibility in US, for 
some examples of services and related data, see Hallack (2011), chapter 6.  
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These examples show how much network access may rely on different rules of use. These access 
features are now clearly established as key elements for defining different gas market regimes: what is 
traded as much as where and when. In practice, defining the transmission services allocation process 
and its temporal and spatial characteristics means defining a substantial part of the commodity market 
foundations. 
5. The actual diversity of gas markets: alternative network investment paths 
We have just seen that the actual use of transmission capacity is central to trade because it gives 
boundary conditions to the feasibility of market trade. Therefore, the development of the network 
infrastructure also moves these market foundations. The network investment path may be defined in 
different ways. A part of this definition depends on how the network is already being used (it gives the 
weight of the past offer and demand of transmission services over investment decisions) or how the 
network might be used in the future; this influences expectations about the possible usage of a new 
infrastructure. Besides that, the investment path also corresponds to a certain allocation of decision 
rights (how much capacity, where, when, what technology, at what cost and price, etc.). The last key 
element is of course the allocation of investment risk.  
There are at least two extreme paths to decide on new network investment. In a very decentralized 
world, it is the users of the network who credibly reveal their demand for new network capacity and 
routes by contracting with the investors around a network action plan. Oppositely, in a very 
centralized world, a central planer makes system forecasts according to preferred scenarios, a selected 
data base and self-defined algorithms. Then the planer derives from his universe of assumptions, 
preferences and computing the likely investments optimizing the forecasted future system and the 
related business plan.  
Let us start by comparing the US and the Victoria models. The US is a typical example of a 
decentralized process of network investment based on shippers firm contracts negotiated with the 
transmission investors ex ante. Oppositely, Victoria shows a network investment central plan. In the 
US, transmission contracts lodge the investment process in the investor - shippers bargaining where 
usages and tariffs are defined according to a given “cost of service” (calculated with the pipeline costs 
and characteristics of the services contracted; and checked by the federal regulator). The construction 
of any new pipeline requires a certificate of “Public Convenience and Necessity” to be obtained from 
this federal regulator. This allows the regulator to oversee if competition is not raising some economic 
inefficiencies or too highly-fixed-cost businesses
16
. Nevertheless the key proof of the economic 
convenience and necessity of a new pipeline is the ex ante commitment of enough shippers’ demand. 
Since the 2000’s, FERC has started accepting that pipeline investors could also bear a part of the 
network utilization risk (in order to get more capacity built – think shale gas boom for instance). But 
FERC is sticking to the firmness of ex ante contracting and requires the pipeline owners to guarantee 
that the costs will not be socialized ex post across the successive generations of contracted users
17
. The 
                                                     
16
 Kahn (1988) has a nice example of a gain in economic efficiency by merging two different pipeline projects in the US.  
17
 “In the Policy Statement, the Commission explained that as the natural gas marketplace has changed, the Commission's 
traditional factors for establishing the need for a project, such as contracts and precedent agreements, may no longer be a 
sufficient indicator that a project is in the public convenience and necessity. The Commission, therefore, changed its 
policy regarding the pricing of construction projects so that market decisions by pipelines and shippers, as opposed to 
regulatory tests, would better reveal whether there is sufficient support for the project and whether the project is 
financially viable. The Commission established a threshold requirement that the pipeline must be prepared to financially 
support the project without subsidy from its existing shippers. This will usually mean that the pipeline would have to 
price the project using incremental rates in which the full costs of the project are recovered solely from the shippers 
subscribing to the new capacity. Under this policy, the pipeline and its expansion customers could share the risks of the 
project, but they could not shift any of those risks onto existing customers.” (FERC, 2000, p. 3) 
http://www.ferc.gov/legal/maj-ord-reg/PL99-3-001.pdf  
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procedure for approval of new pipelines is hence highly formalized. Network investment developers 
must declare an “open season” where users are invited to assess their capacity needs (before getting 
the regulated final price)
18
. Investors have to get enough firm commitment of the future users ex ante. 
These players negotiating the coming investments are also the ones who must bear the risk. FERC 
avoids cross-subsidies among generations of users, especially between users of an existent capacity 
and users contracting to add capacity to the same pipe. Thus, each investment is to be fully paid by the 
buyers of the new transmission services contracted by the new infrastructure. Of course, the present 
use of existing pipelines impacts the investment decision through shippers’ willingness to buy new 
transmission services. If shippers are looking for more transmission services and are not able to find 
any or enough in the secondary market
19
, they will also be inclined to look for new investments. In a 
nutshell the process of network investment in the US is encapsulated in a well-defined set of property 
rights for each unit of past or new transmission services: the straight “single pipeline contract” 
(Makholm 2012)
20
.  
Totally opposite to this is the Victoria model 
21
. Here transmission services are allocated among 
users only after the opening of the new infrastructure and only at the short-term operational stage: 
through a ranking based on the commodity market price differential. In this model, one cannot ask 
users to commit to a preferred capacity to be used in the future as these users do not hold any 
individually exclusive rights to use the future network capacity. Thus, the investment plan is inevitably 
conceived by a central planner. In practice, this planner is not the transmission operator (like in the 
EU), but the market operator, the publicly owned Australian Energy Market Operator (AEMO).
22
 It 
determines the volumes the pipelines might carry and the amount of gas to be stored inside these 
pipelines. Remember that the network -by changing its internal pressure- can store more or less gas; it 
is called the “line-pack”23. AEMO is not an advisor in this process, but is actually responsible for 
determining whether the capacity should be expanded (Moran 2002). However, all the risks are not 
borne by AEMO or the transmission companies but the collectivity of the users. All related costs are to 
be put into the network tariffs.  
In the UK (as a leading EU example), the investment decision may come both in a centralized and 
decentralized manner. The centralized process is the traditional and the bigger one.
24 T
he network 
owner and operator (National Grid) proposes a development plan to the regulator. If accepted, the 
assets are introduced into the regulated asset base when operating and the allowed revenue is 
                                                     
18
 There is an initial tariff proposed by the pipeline which is reviewed after the investment (plus a test period). The pipelines 
must publish rates for firm carriage and rates for interruptible service. Tariff rates must be approved by FERC and are 
normally strictly in line with costs, which are full costs in the case of firm access and operating costs for interruptible 
service. The US approach effectively transfers the equity in the pipeline to the firm capacity holders. 
19
 Note that US shippers (owning the right to transport gas) have the right to trade their capacity on the secondary market, 
where the price is not regulated. 
20
 The USA carriage system is frequently called contract carriage, in the sense that the shippers´ rights and duties depend on 
the contract. 
21
 In Australia the National Gas Law and Rules set out the regulatory framework for the gas pipeline sector. The AER 
(Australian Energy Regulator) regulates pipelines in jurisdictions others than Western Australia. The pipelines can be 
regulated or not and are applied among the regulated different models (and level of regulation). The Victorian 
Transmission System has been regulated since 1997. 
22
 The Australian Energy Market Operator (AEMO) was created by the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) and 
developed under the guidance of the Ministerial Council on Energy (MCE). AEMO is responsible for guaranteeing the 
electricity and gas market functions, NEM (National Electricity Market) system operations, management of Victoria’s 
gas transmission network and national transmission planning. 
23
 The carriage system observed in Victoria (Australia) is called market carriage, as the rights and duties depend on the gas 
market. On the investment decision side, the decision has a big hand in the gas market operator forecast. 
24
 The carriage system in UK is frequently called regulated carriage system, where the rights and duties of shippers depend 
on a set of rules (network code). 
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recovered from the community of the users through the transmission tariffs. However, for a more 
efficient network development, the UK also opened a users’ commitment process through “open 
seasons”. It works with auctions of entry capacity. However, it does not mimic the US case. On the 
one hand, this “entry auctioning” does not end with strong property rights over the use of the new 
capacity
25
. On the other hand, the capacity actually built is not restricted to the amount chosen by the 
users. Furthermorethese committed users bear a significant risk as the price will be determined 
parallelly to network tariffs set in the future.  
Table 2 - Network investment: comparison  
 Who drives the 
process? 
Who bears the risks? How network uses impact 
investment decisions? 
United States Both Investors and 
users 
Users contracting for the 
new capacity 
Through the users 
willingness to contract 
United Kingdom Investors and 
regulator (+ 
mechanism to grasp 
users preferences) 
All network users26 Through the assumptions 
of network development 
plan 
Victoria Regulated Market 
Operator 
All network users27 Through the assumptions 
of the network 
development plan 
Brazil Government agency 
(+ mechanism to 
grasp users 
preferences) 
Users contracting for the 
new capacity  
Through the assumptions 
of network development 
plan and existing set of 
contracts 
Source: Authors elaboration 
In Brazil, the network development until the 2009 Gas Law was mainly based on ex ante contracting, 
as in the US. Forecasts, risks and duties were then placed on the users’ and pipeline owners’ shoulders. 
With the new law, the government took over (through a dedicated public agency EPE
28
) the planning 
of network development. The objective is said to be to accelerate network investment, but it is still 
unclear five years later how this will effectively work, who will actually bear the risk and how the 
recorded actual network use will affect network development.  
As we have seen, there the investment paths used for developing the gas networks are –again- quite 
different across these countries. The roles of network users, pipelines owners and central planners in 
deciding the investment and allocating its risks are also quite contrasted. It goes from a central 
investment path supposed to calculate everything ex ante at the entire system level but puts all the ex 
post risks on the community of future users. This investment path is nevertheless coherent with a 
                                                     
25
 Entry capacity is separated from the exit capacity as explained above, so the actual path that the shipper may use can 
change. There is a model forecasting the demand/offer and flows, but it brings us back to the centralized model.  
26
 The regulator determines how to share the cost among all the users through tariffs definition. Different participation in 
the costs can be allocated among a set of shippers according to the tariffs structures. For instance, one possible choice 
could be set to zero participation in the cost allocation for some subset of users.  
27
 The regulator determines how to share the cost among all the users through tariffs definition. Different participation in 
the costs can be allocated among set of shippers according to the tariffs structures. For instance, one possible choice 
could be set to zero participation in the cost allocation for some subset of users.  
28
 Empresa de Planejamento Energético. 
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“common carriage” access regime where the users’ ex ante individual property rights on transmission 
services are weak. Oppositely, we also find a quasi-private investment path where all key ex ante 
decisions are bilaterally framed by investors and users and all risks borne by these ex ante decision-
makers. Of course these decision makers ignore the system level effects of their private choice. But 
this is coherent with a “contract carriage” access regime where the users’ ex ante individual property 
rights on individual units of transmission services are strong. One sees that the loop between each 
contrasted access regime and its particular investment path is mainly rationale. 
6. Final remarks 
Yes, gas transmission systems are not necessarily natural monopolies. But one cannot derive too much 
from this right assumption. Observing several cases of liberalization in the gas industry, one also 
observes significantly different choices in the design and the implementation of trading arrangements. 
It comes from another assumption to be made: gas liberalization trajectories depend both on the 
architecture of the gas network and on the access regime implemented. 
In this paper, we have characterized the gas industry restructuring as the design of a system of 
rights to access the infrastructure. Although the notion of “open access” has been often used in 
economic literature, it still lacked definition as an arrangement of rights to use a common 
infrastructure. We have showed that the mechanisms defining and implementing open access rights are 
actually the roots of the diversity of gas liberalization designs, thus the “à la carte” policy.  
From a theoretical viewpoint, the higher the difficulty to exclude potential rival users from an 
actual access to the network (as imposed by the common carriage regulatory frame), the higher the 
“commons” problems that need to be coped with when defining users ex ante rights and implementing 
actual network operation rules. Getting these access property rights better defined would have required 
lowering the costs of usage exclusion, and avoiding the socialization of associated network operation 
costs.  
In the US, each pipeline typically sells point to point transportation through individual long term 
contracts. It is up to the pipeline users to organize their individual portfolios of point-to-point contracts 
into something more flexible at the industry level (think of a secondary trade among themselves). It is 
up to the market players to find or to create these secondary markets, being organized or not; or with 
brokers. Network users have firm transmission rights and they have to bear the transaction costs of any 
needed rearrangement. On the other hand, as the rules of network usage are encapsulated into ex ante 
negotiated contracts, these rules are often more responsive to the anticipated users’ needs. Moreover, 
such strong rights push the users to reveal their true preferences and help competition with pipeline 
investors’ new entry. This is why the carriage contracts have been a key coordination mechanism for 
the long run evolution of the US industry.  
In the EU, on the other hand, the network of gas transmission is generally considered zone by zone 
as a basket assembling all the transmission assets found into each zone. This causes these assets to 
maintain monopolistic characteristics because of the exclusive rights of operation given in each zone 
to a single “system operator”. This goes with an access regime based on unilaterally and centrally 
defined regulated rules of open access. These regulated central rules allow the creation of “virtual” 
commodity trade areas corresponding to the transmission operation zones. That is, within these zones 
any gas arriving at an entry point may be carried to any exit point into the same zone, so there is no 
individual transaction cost for this pair of buyers and sellers. The trade system is completed by a large 
amount of gas system operations (managed by the system operator) in order to bridge the gap between 
the actual network flows resulting from the network users’ actions and the virtual flows having been 
taken into account in the commodity trade. While increasing the appetite to trade within a zone, this 
dual process (virtual trade/actual network flows) comes at the cost of a weaker set of efficiency 
incentives.  
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The Brazilian model used to have features close to those of the US system. However, in the last 
years, policy-makers have been increasingly worried about the lack of entry in the commodity market 
and of liquidity in the secondary trading of transmission services. Thus, they are considering changing 
the system and traveling the path set by European design. A centralized mechanism for pipelines 
investment has been launched recently (January 2014), and future measures towards more centralized 
regulation will be seen soon.  
In Australia, the Victoria model is closer to a typical “nodal power market” design than to any 
other gas market either the US or the EU. This model prioritizes the short-term efficiency by 
allocating a centrally calculated short term system capacity according to commodity price differences 
(efficiency is defined as allocating capacity to whoever values the commodity the most according to 
actual transmission constraints). Here the right to use the transmission service directly depends on the 
commodity market and their relation is defined by a computing algorithm. We may consider this as the 
opposite of the US model, as a transmission right in Victoria is not a well-defined, tradable and 
individual right. However, in principle, if the gas commodity market is efficient, so will be that short-
term capacity allocation. Of course, the efficiency of that allocation also depends on the computing 
capability of the algorithm. And there is unfortunately no simple and transparent way to do that 
computing. To close, as the individual property rights are so weak for each individual user, the 
incentives for each user to individually contribute to new capacity investment ex ante are as weak. 
Besides all the other specificities of existing gas markets, a key foundation of each is found in its 
regime of transmission access rights. By understanding how these access regimes work, we can better 
understand the economic rationale of the existing gas network and market diversity.   
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